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Abstract 
Recently the need for “digital evidence bags” – a common storage format for digital 
evidence – has been identified as a key requirement for enabling inter-organisational 
sharing of digital evidence, and interoperability between forensic analysis tools. Recent 
work has described an ontology based approach to correlation of event log based evidence, 
using semantic web technologies for describing and representing event log based digital 
evidence. In this paper we apply the representational approach to the integration of 
metadata related to digital evidence, and propose a globally unique identification scheme 
for digital evidence and related metadata. We relate the representational approach to the 
digital evidence bags concept identifying a number of shortcomings. We propose an 
alternative architecture for digital evidence bags, which we call the sealed digital evidence 
bags architecture. This approach treats bags as immutable objects, and facilitates the 
building of a corpus of digital evidence by composition and referencing between evidence 
bags. This architecture facilitates modular forensic tool development and interoperability 
between forensics tools. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The rapid pace of innovation in digital technologies presents substantial challenges to 
digital forensics. New memory and storage devices and refinements in existing ones provide 
constant challenges for the acquisition of digital evidence. The proliferation of competing 
file formats and communications protocols challenges one’s ability to extract meaning from 
the arrangement of ones and zeros within. Overarching these challenges are the concerns of 
maintaining the integrity of any evidence found, and reliably explaining any conclusions 
drawn.   
Researchers and practitioners in the field of digital forensics have responded to these 
challenges by producing tools for acquisition and analysis of evidence. To date, these 
efforts have resulted in a variety of ad-hoc and proprietary formats for storing evidence 
content, analysis results, and evidence metadata, such as integrity and provenance 
information. Conversion between the evidence formats utilized and produced by the current 
generation of forensic tools is complicated. The process is time consuming and manual in 
nature, and there exists the potential that it may produce incorrect evidence data, or lose 
metadata (DFRWS 2005). Validation of the results produced is hindered by this lack of 
format standardisation.  
It is with these concerns in mind that calls have been made for a universal container for the 
capture of digital evidence. Recently, the term “Digital evidence bags” was proposed to 
refer to a container for digital evidence, evidence metadata, integrity information, and 
access and usage audit records (Turner 2005). Subsequently, the Digital Forensics Research 
Workshop (DFRWS) recently formed a working group with a goal of defining a 
standardised Common Digital Evidence Storage Format (CDESF) for storing digital 
evidence and associated metadata (DFRWS, 2005).  
Another source of complexity related to the ad-hoc nature of forensic tools is the absence of 
a common representational format for evidence metadata. This is not a trivial problem due 
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to the nature of the forensics domain, which deals with massive conceptual complexity 
within multiple layers of abstraction. The challenge here is to identify a means that 
decouples the models of evidence and evidence metadata used by forensics tools from the 
implementation logic of these tools. Furthermore, this needs to be accomplished in a 
manner that facilitates the establishment of provenance and maintains integrity. 
This representational problem is not simply limited to the challenge of tool interoperability. 
In outlining the “Big Computer Forensic Challenges”, Spafford observes that practitioners 
and researchers in the field of digital forensics do not use standard terminology (Palmer, 
2001). It is not surprising then that we find limited attention paid to the formal definition of 
taxonomies or ontologies describing this domain. 
We propose the use of ontologies as a solution to these terminological and representational 
problems. We have produced a number of basic ontologies modelling the domain of digital 
evidence acquisition, computer hardware, and networks, and described these ontologies 
using the Web Ontology Language (OWL) (McGuiness, 2001). A subsumer of taxonomies, 
ontologies are defined by Gruber (1993) as an explicit specification of a conceptualization. 
More descriptively, an ontology is a means of conceptualising a domain of discourse, in 
terms of concepts, properties, and relationships of entities. Ontology languages, the purpose 
of which are to describe ontologies, hold the promise of empowering machines to have 
greater ability to reason over and analyse information, by nature of sharing a common 
understanding of the information at hand (Undercoffer et. al., 2004). Furthermore, 
ontologies encourage knowledge sharing and reuse within a domain, which has the potential 
to lead towards a convergence of vocabulary in the forensics domain.  
In this paper we propose an open architecture for integrating digital evidence by applying an 
ontology based approach to Turner’s digital evidence bags concept. We enumerate the 
representational requirements for the metadata component of an open common digital 
evidence storage format, and formalise the domain by describing it with an ontology.  We 
demonstrate an architecture for digital evidence bags which facilitates modular composition 
of forensic tools by way of an open metadata format. Further, we propose a novel means of 
identifying digital evidence, and digital evidence bags, which supports arbitrary referencing 
of information within and between digital evidence bags. Additionally, we propose an 
alternative approach to Turner’s design, based on a sealed bag metaphor. 
2 RELATED WORK 
In this section we firstly describe current approaches to digital evidence storage containers. 
We then review current architectures. In order to put the digital evidence containers and 
metadata in the context of the forensic tool landscape, we then outline the state of the art in 
theory of operation of digital forensics tools. To provide background to our metadata 
approach, we describe the basics of the World Wide Web Consortium’s (W3C’s) semantic 
web technology stack, the ontology language OWL and the data model called Resource 
Description Framework (RDF). A survey of the use of ontology in the computer security 
field is then presented. 
1.1 Digital evidence storage formats 
The Advanced Forensics Format (AFF) has recently been proposed as a disk image storage 
format, It includes storing of acquisition related metadata in the same container as the disk 
image. Garfinkel et al (2006) describe the AFF and summarise the key characteristics of 
nine different forensic file formats, and outline the desirable characteristics for an image 
storage container. They conclude that the AFF is the only publicly disclosed forensic format 
which supports storage of arbitrary metadata. However, the metadata storage mechanism in 
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the AFF is limited to name/value pairs and makes no provision for attaching semantics to 
the name. 
The de-facto standard in commercial forensics software, Encase1, uses a monolithic case file 
for storing case related metadata and stores filesystem images in separate and potentially 
segmented files. The format of the case file is proprietary. 
1.1.1 Digital evidence bags 
Turner introduces the concept of a Digital Evidence Bag (DEB) by attempting to replicate 
the key features of the physical evidence bags used for traditional evidence capture. The key 
structural components of a physical evidence bag are the bag itself, a means of bag 
identification (potentially a serial number), an area for recording evidence related 
information (which we refer to as a tag), and optionally, a tamper evident security seal. We 
categorise the key features of physical evidence bags as follows: 
Evidence Metadata Records : Standard evidence metadata includes a description of the 
evidence, the location, date and time of the acquisition of the evidence.  
Provenance Records : Includes chain of custody information, as well as information 
pertaining to the collector of the evidence.  
Identification Records :Identification information includes a unique serial number (or seal 
number) which uniquely identifies the bag, and other case related information such as the 
case number, item number, collecting organisation, suspect and victim. 
Integrity Device : Pieces of evidence collected at an investigation scene are placed in 
evidence bags and sealed on the spot, potentially with a tamper evident tape closure seal. 
This seal, and the construction characteristics of the bag itself, help to ensure Integrity of 
the evidence by indicating tampering. 
Evidence Container : The inside of the bag. 
 
It is worth noting here that the use of the features listed above varies dependent on 
jurisdiction.  
Turner’s proposal for a digital evidence bag addresses a number of aspects of the above 
features. A file archive structure is proposed which defines a specific naming scheme for 
files containing digital evidence, separate files containing evidence metadata, and a singular 
file which contains evidence integrity, provenance and identification information. Figure 1 
depicts the structure of Turner’s digital evidence bag. 
A DEB is a collection of the Digital Evidence files, Index Files and a single Tag File. 
Turner does not detail the implementation of the container grouping these evidence files, 
however we assume that in practise, a DEB would be an archive (tar, zip, etc) within which 
these files are contained. 
                                                 
1
 http://www.guidancesoftware.com/ 
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 Figure 1: Turner's Digital Evidence Bag 
Individual elements of digital evidence collected, such as filesystem images, network traces, 
or the contents of image files are stored in Digital Evidence Files, which are identified by a 
file extension .bagNN. The NN refers to a unique number. Correspondingly, Evidence 
Metadata, such as file last access time is stored in similarly named files with an extension 
.indexNN. The pairing of a single Digital Evidence File with its corresponding Evidence 
Metadata file is refered to by Turner as an Evidence Unit. Turner does not describe naming 
of the files other than the extensions defined. It is unclear as to whether of not multiple 
pieces of content are stored in a .bagNN file. 
Integrity, provenance and identification information are stored as unstructured text within 
the Tag File, which is identified by the file extension .tag. The tag file also enumerates the 
names of all of the Evidence Units.  
The architecture of Turner’s Digital Evidence Bags appears to be oriented more towards a 
single monolithic digital evidence bag being used in a case, as a container for all digital 
evidence acquired. Secondary evidence (evidence derived from the analysis of earlier 
acquired evidence, such as files extracted from a filesystem image) would appear in this 
scheme to be added to the same digital evidence bag as the original image. This involves 
modification to the tag file and the addition of new files to the evidence bag. Provenance is 
assured by the onion like use of hashing of the contents of the Tag File.  
A potentially confusing aspect of Turner’s DEB proposal is that modification of the Tag 
file, and the addition of new files to the DEB may lead the layman to the conclusion that the 
monolithic bag is in fact never sealed, thus raising doubts as to the integrity of the evidence. 
While this may be seen more as an impedance mismatch in translating the evidence bag 
metaphor, we suggest an alternate architecture for digital evidence bags. The architecture 
we present favours treating evidence bags as immutable objects. Addition of information is 
done outside the bag, in much the same way that information is added to the tag of a 
physical evidence bag without breaking the seal of the bag.  
Turner’s structure does not define a scheme for referencing of evidence and metadata 
between digital evidence bags. Therefore the ability to compose multiple evidence bags into 
a corpus does not appear feasible. The format and vocabulary of the Evidence Metadata, 
Identification Information and Provenance Information is syntax free, and unspecified, 
geared only towards human interpretation. 
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1.2 Ontology and knowledge representation languages 
Current approaches to representing digital evidence and digital evidence related metadata 
may be characterised as predominately ad-hoc (in the case of open source tools) or closed 
and monolithic (in the case of proprietary tools). In response to the absence of an 
interoperable evidence representation we find inspiration in the recent efforts of the WWW 
Consortium (W3C) towards the vision of a Semantic Web, a web of machine and human 
interpretable data (Berners-Lee et. al., 2001). While the goal of the semantic web is a web 
of information published on the internet, our proposal parallels this in the small by 
proposing the architecture for a semantic web of evidence. In this section we present a brief 
introduction to standards which comprise the current semantic web technology stack.  
Currently, the semantic web stack comprises two logical layers: a data layer, and an 
ontology layer (presented below in Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Current Semantic Web Standards 
The data layer is comprised of the Resource Description Framework (RDF) language, 
which is based on a simple graph based data model. RDF is used to provide a common data 
representation. The basic unit of data in an RDF graph is the triple, which consists of a 
Subject, a Predicate, and an Object. The triple is represented using nodes and a single arc2 
as in Figure 3. The meaning of a RDF triple, when asserted, is that a relationship, named by 
the Predicate exists between the Subject and the Object.  
 
Figure 3: An RDF Triple 
The Subject and Predicate are both named using a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) 
(Berners-Lee et. al. 1998) Often, a URL, a more specific type of URI is used. The Object 
may either be a URI or a Literal, which is a string that may be optionally given a data type. 
The use of URI’s to name the nodes and arcs in RDF triple enables building complex 
graphs of assertions.  
The RDF data model is defined in terms of nodes and arcs, as such, it is an abstract model. 
A textual serialization of  RDF graphs is a necessary precursor to interoperability. For this 
the RDF standard defines an XML based serialization called XML/RDF (Klyne & Carrol, 
2004).  
While the semi-structured data model of RDF provides an extensible vocabulary for naming 
elements of data, it only provides rudimentary features for categorising these data elements 
                                                 
2
 We note that the arrow in the diagram indicates the ordering relationship, not flow. 
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within the graph. For example, a popular model for categorising “things” is the Frame-
based one originally proposed by Minsky (1975), where a frame represents an object or 
concept, to which are attached attributes (or properties, or slots) that represent component 
parts of the concept or object. The Object-Oriented paradigm underlying Java and C++ may 
be seen as the application of frame based theory to the structuring of software (Lassila, et 
al., 2001).  
Recent evolution of the Frame based-approach to knowledge representation has led to 
ontologies becoming widely used as a means for specifying and describing concepts and 
their relationships (McGuiness, 2001). Several ontology languages have been developed in 
recent times, including the Web Ontology Language (OWL), and DAML+OIL (Harmelen 
et al., 2004). OWL, which has recently been standardised by the W3C, provides a 
mechanism for describing an ontology in terms of collections of descriptions of concepts 
within a domain of discourse (classes), properties of classes, and restrictions on properties. 
OWL hooks into the RDF language in a manner that attaches meaning to the vocabulary 
used within the RDF.  
Both OWL and DAML+OIL are based on a branch of logics called Description Logics 
(DL). These logics are a subset of First Order Logic (FOL) that are well suited to expressing 
terminology and instance information, with efficient and decidable classification oriented 
inference characteristics. The OWL language, itself a dialect of RDF, provides support for 
merging of ontologies, through the use of language features which enable importing other 
ontologies and enable expression of conceptual equivalence and disjunction (Smith et al., 
2004). This facilitates separate ontology development, refinement and re-use.   
1.3 Ontology in computer security & forensics 
There is little to no published research specifying formal ontologies for computer forensics 
or computer-related crime. Schatz et. al. (2004), however use an ontology to describe 
categorisations and abstraction hierarchies modelling the concepts embodied in event logs. 
Abstraction aware rules are used to correlate events to higher level event abstractions for the 
purpose of forensics. This work publishes no ontology, and does not address issues of 
evidence identification, integration, provenance or integrity.  
We have identified limited literature focusing on modelling of the domain of cases. Bogen 
and Dampier (2005) apply case domain modelling as a structured approach for analysing 
case facts, identifying relevant case concepts, and documenting this information. Their 
focus is on modelling as a conceptual tool informing methodology, rather than as a means 
of fixing the semantics to evidence material.  
A number of applications of ontologies have been observed in the computer security field 
especially relating to intrusion detection. Raskin et al. (2001) argue for the adoption of 
ontology as a powerful means for organising and unifying the terminology and 
nomenclature of the information security field. They observe that the use of ontology in the 
information security field will increase the systematics, allow for modularity and could 
make new phenomena predictable within the security domain. Schumacher (2003) focuses 
on systematic approaches to improving software security, by using Security Patterns, the 
application of the design patterns approach to security. Ontologies are used as a means to 
model both the security concepts referred to by the patterns, as well as the patterns 
themselves.  
A “Target Centric Ontology for Intrusion Detection” describing model of computer attack 
was produced by Undercoffer et al. (2004). Their ontology is based on the following basic 
classes : Host, System Component, Attack, Input, Means, and Consequence. They use this 
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ontology as the model for a rule based distributed IDS.  The “Network Entity Relationship 
Diagram (NERD)” (Goldman et al. 2001) ontology was defined as a component of an IDS 
alert fusion prototype, SCYLLARUS. This ontology was defined in the early description 
logic environment CLASSIC (Borgida et al., 1989). Only the ontology, which contains 
concepts focused around network and host was published. 
3 DEFINITIONS 
Our concerns involve representation and terminology. In order to avoid confusion, we 
define the following terms we use throughout the paper, and in our digital evidence 
ontology. As we are talking about Digital Evidence, we omit the use of the word Digital in 
our definitions. 
Evidence Content: Contiguous bytes of computer data.  Typically data which is stored in a 
file, or a stream of a file, or in raw storage, such as the ordered sectors of a disk. 
Evidence Content File: A file containing evidence content. 
Evidence Metadata: Contextual information which is related to Evidence Content. For 
example, commonly gathered Evidence Metadata related to a JPEG image might be the file 
name, the path which it was stored in, and the last modification, last access and creation 
times of the file.  
Provenance Metadata: Information which relates to the provenance of the evidence. For 
example, information about who captured the evidence, where it was stored, what tools 
were used, and integrity controls fall into this category.  
Integrity Metadata: Metadata which is used to detect the modification of evidence content 
or metadata. 
Digital Evidence: Refers to a related set of Evidence Content (or analysed evidence 
content), Evidence Metadata. 
Secondary Evidence : Digital evidence produced as a product of an analysis tool. 
Image : A contiguous sequence of bytes, which is a copy of a digital artefact. 
4 AN OPEN ARCHITECTURE FOR DIGITAL EVIDENCE BAGS 
The primary aim of our work is to identify a general solution which meets the 
representational needs for storing metadata in digital evidence bags. We seek to do this in a 
manner that allows evolution, separate definition of, and interoperability between the 
abstractions which are used in forensic tools, in a manner that is not dependant on the 
management of a single entity or governing body.  
We look to the near future, where analysis cases may involve digital evidence from sources 
orders of magnitude more numerous than the current norm. In fact we see the beginnings of 
this challenge as investigations of P2P networks involve multiple terabyte sized images, 
sourced from numerous locations and computers. We expect that the monolithic approaches 
to digital evidence containers will not scale to this future, for reasons such as evidence bag 
size, concurrent access, and IO efficiency. For example, consider the a case where two 
multi-terabyte images must be acquired. The use of a single monolithic DEB for containing 
both images would imply serialising access to the DEB, and prohibit acquiring the images 
in parallel. With current IO speeds, this would add tens if not hundreds of hours to the 
acquisition time.  
In order to address these scaling issues we propose a compositional rather than monolithic 
approach to assembling of a corpus of digital evidence. We do this by defining an 
identification scheme that is independent of location and global in nature. This architecture 
facilitates the building of a corpus of evidence by recursively embedding digital evidence 
bags within digital evidence bags, as well as by reference, which we depict in Figure 4. We 
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call our architecture Sealed Digital Evidence Bags (SBEB’s) in reference to Turner’s 
proposal. 
Tag.rdf
Tag.rdf.sig
Tag.rdf
hda.dd
Tag.rdf
Tag.rdf.sig
Tag.rdf
hda.dd
Embedded DEB Referenced DEB
 
Figure 4: Referencing nested and external digital evidence bags 
For example, in the case of the multi-terabyte imaging case discussed above, both imaging 
processes could happen in parallel, producing two digital evidence bags. A further digital 
evidence bag, which references both these images could then be used for adding provenance 
metadata such as the examiner’s name and case number. 
1.4 Evidence and metadata identification 
Recalling that in RDF, Subjects, Predicates and Objects are named using a URI, we use a 
special category of URI called a Uniform Resource Name (URN) (Moates, 1997) for 
identifying digital evidence bags and metadata instances. URN’s are intended to serve as a 
persistent, location-independent resource identifier. Following work done in the life 
sciences area in uniquely identifying proteins in distributed databases, which has resulted in 
the definition of the Life Sciences Identifier (LSID) standard (Seneger, 2004), we propose a 
digital evidence specific URN scheme. This scheme, which we call Digital Evidence 
Identifiers (DEID) is based on the organisation of the tool user, and employs message digest 
algorithms as a globally unique identifier. The format of a Digital Evidence Identifier is as 
follows: 
urn:deid:organisation:digestalgorithm:digest:discriminator 
For example, we identify a particular image taken of a file in our example further below 
using the following URN: 
urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:dc04e8f06b2a32e7d673c380c4d2c8a1d5ea17d4:image 
The string “deid” is used to provide a unique namespace for digital evidence identifiers. We 
provide scoping information in the organisation field which would potentially enable one to 
resolve a URN back to set of information or an evidence bag as has been done in the LSID 
work. The digestalgorithm field refers to the message digest algorithm used to generate text 
in the following field. The descriminator field is provided for further addition of naming 
terms. It should be noted that we rely on the collision free nature of message digest 
algorithms in order to assure globally unique names. Given the current state of uncertainty 
with regard to the possibility of collisions using MD5 or SHA1, our proposal provides for 
the use of other digest algorithms. 
Of course these identifiers are long and unwieldy and not suited for use as names for the 
evidence we are concerned with. Evidence may be given more human friendly, case specific 
names by asserting further RDF triples which have the identifier as the subject.  
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1.5 Digital evidence bag structure 
Sealable digital evidence bags follow a similar structure to Turner’s bags. However, in 
order to facilitate an interoperable representation, we use RDF for the Tag and Evidence 
Metadata. The Tag File of any digital evidence bag is called Tag.rdf. The naming of the 
Evidence Metadata files is tool or user determined, however the extension is .rdf to signify 
that the format of the file is RDF.  
The XML/RDF format does not support recursive definition of  RDF/XML content within 
the content of another RDF/XML content block, and makes no provision for arbitrary text 
outside the syntax of the XML syntax. This leads us to maintain integrity information 
regarding the content of the Tag in a file external to the Tag, unlike the DEB proposal. 
Turner’s DEB uses an onion like approach where a hash of the contents of the Tag is 
recursively appended to the Tag. We instead define a Tag Integrity File, called Tag.rdf.sig, 
which contains integrity information pertaining to the Tag. Sealable digital evidence bags 
are designed to be created and populated with evidence and metadata, then sealed exactly 
once. The Tag of an SDEB is immutable after the Tag Integrity File has been added to the 
SDEB. Before that the bags are unsealed and mutable. 
 
Figure 5: Proposed digital evidence bag structure 
In order to demonstrate the SDEB architecture in context, we have developed a prototype 
online acquisition tool for creating a digital evidence bag containing images of the Internet 
Explorer cache and history index files (these are also referred to as web browser logs). 
These files are typically located in a number of subfolders of the  \Local Settings\Temporary 
Internet Files\ path under the user’s profile directory on a windows host. The files in 
question are all named index.dat.  
We present the contents of the digital evidence bag produced by the prototype tool called 
acquireIELogs.py in Table 1.  The tool creates images of the browser log files according to 
a programmatic naming scheme based on their original filename, in combination with the 
user name, the type of file (cache or history), and the specific history file set. For reasons 
discussed below in the section titled “Integrity” we do not define the integrity mechanism 
for the Tag File. As such the tool does not produce the Tag Integrity file.   
jbloggs.history.MSHist012006010420060105.index.dat.rdf 
jbloggs.history.MSHist012006010420060105.index.dat 
jbloggs.history.MSHist012006010320060104.index.dat.rdf 
jbloggs.history.MSHist012006010320060104.index.dat 
jbloggs.history.MSHist012005121220051219.index.dat.rdf 
jbloggs.history.MSHist012005121220051219.index.dat 
jbloggs.history.MSHist012005121920051226.index.dat.rdf 
jbloggs.history.MSHist012005121920051226.index.dat 
jbloggs.cache.index.dat.rdf 
jbloggs.cache.index.dat 
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jbloggs.history.index.dat.rdf 
jbloggs.history.index.dat 
Tag.rdf 
Table 1: The contents of a browser log SDEB 
1.6 Metadata Model 
The Evidence Metadata Files produced by the prototype tool all contain metadata of a 
similar format to that presented in Table 2 in an abridged form. Figure 5 presents a node arc 
graph of the portions of the same data. In this case, we discuss the Evidence Metadata File 
named jbloggs.cache.index.dat.rdf.  
<de:FileImage rdf:about="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:4056e4786fc460d9adbe98a0bc19b29a2104c476:image"> 
 <de:imageContainer rdf:resource="file:///./jbloggs.cache.index.dat"/> 
 <de:imageOf 
rdf:resource="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:4056e4786fc460d9adbe98a0bc19b29a2104c476:original"/>  
 <de:acquisitionTool> 
  <de:OnlineAcquisitionTool rdf:about=”http://www.isi.qut.edu.au/2005/acquireIELogs.py”> 
   <de:name>acquireIELogs.py</de:name> 
   <de:version>0.1</de:version> 
  </de:OnlineAcquisitionTool> 
 </de:acquisitionTool> 
</de:FileImage> 
 
<wb:BrowserCacheFile rdf:about="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:4056e4786fc460d9adbe98a0bc19b29a2104c476:original"> 
 <fs:filePath>D:\Documents and Settings\jbloggs\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\\index.dat</fs:filePath> 
 <de:messageDigest 
rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1">4056e4786fc460d9adbe98a0bc19b29a2104c476</de:messagedige
st> 
</wb:BrowserCacheFile> 
Table 2: XML/RDF content of Evidence Metadata File named jbloggs.cache.index.dat.rdf 
This file contains RDF instance data which asserts two top level instances. The instances 
describe the relationship between the Evidence Content (the content of a Evidence Content 
File in the digital evidence bag) and the original piece of evidence, which is an image of a 
Web Browser Cache File, located on a particular host. The contents of these two files are, 
from the digital perspective, identical. This results in a DEID URN with the same message 
digest value. However their locations are substantially different. We discriminate between 
the two instances by using the labels “image” and “original” in the discriminator field of the 
DEID URN. This distinguishs between the FileImage and the BrowserCacheFile 
respectively. 
The tool generates Provenance Metadata identifying itself by name, location, and version, 
relating itself to the FileImage by use of the acquisitionTool property. Provenance 
information identifying the examiner running the tool would be added to a separate 
evidence bag, which refers to this sealed one. We do this in order to simplify the acquisition 
tool, preferring that more complex data entry and annotation tasks are performed using a 
task specific tool, such as an analogue of Turner’s Tag editor application.  
The property and class names used in the vocabulary above are defined in ontologies 
specific to the domains of discourse that we are dealing with. The prefix de is an alias for an 
ontology stored in the document located at http://isi.qut.edu.au/2005/digitalevidence, which 
describes the digital evidence domain. Hence, de:FileImage refers to a specific concept (a 
class) defined in this ontology. Similarly we define an ontology for filesystem related 
concepts aliased as fs (http://isi.qut.edu.au/2005/filesystem) and web browser related aliased 
as wb (http://isi.qut.edu.au/2005/webbrowser). 
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 Figure 6: RDF Graph relating Evidence Context and Digital Evidence Metadata 
Figure 6 depicts a portion of the RDF graph implied by the content of the Evidence 
Metadata File discussed above and presented in Table 2. We discriminate here between the 
Evidence Context Metadata, and Digital Evidence Metadata.  
1.7 Tag file 
The tag file contains the RDF data representing the digital evidence bag and its contents. 
The DEID of the deb:DigitalEvidenceBag instance is based on the hash of the content of the 
Evidence Metadata Files, in the order in which they are defined in Table 3. The 
deb:bagContents property is an ordered list which refer to instances of digital evidence 
metadata contained in the digital evidence metadata files. 
<deb:DigitalEvidenceBag rdf:about="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:44bc23235f5e797aae992e5de09524e9071fd8c6"> 
  <deb:bagContents> 
    <rdf:Seq> 
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:dc04e8f06b2a32e7d673c380c4d2c8a1d5ea17d4:image"/> 
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:4a03ed30ebdf919004d4b40222b721c4771adee9:image"/> 
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:c117652d98a4f612979c19f5701d278e025749fa:image"/> 
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:05de1243f67753150334968a2effcc4f8114ef45:image"/> 
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:f3a9fd3fcc017d822f10bc4466b6d19ddbdd5042:image"/> 
      <rdf:li rdf:resource="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:4056e4786fc460d9adbe98a0bc19b29a2104c476:image"/> 
    </rdf:Seq> 
  <deb:bagContents> 
</deb:DigitalEvidenceBag> 
Table 3: Digital Evidence Bag instance data stored in the Tag File 
1.8 Integrity 
Current best practise for ensuring the integrity of digital evidence involves the use of 
collision resistant message digest functions. Typically a message digest is taken of the 
original evidence, and recorded in a manner that asserts the time of the digest being taken 
(often via contemporaneous notes or printouts). The integrity of subsequent images made, 
or copies of images made may then be ensured by taking the message digest of the image or 
copy, and comparing with the original message digest.  
In this proposal, integrity of evidence and evidence metadata is ensured by the use of 
chained message digests. Besides using the message digest of each piece of Evidence 
Content as a component of a unique identifier for both the Evidence Content Metadata 
instance and the Digital Evidence Metadata instance, we also define a property within the 
class de:EvidenceContext class called de:messageDigest. This property is presented in 
context in Table 4. 
<wb:IEBrowserCacheFile rdf:about="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:4056e4786fc460d9adbe98a0bc19b29a2104c476:original"> 
 <de:messageDigest  rdf:datatype=http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1 
            >4056e4786fc460d9adbe98a0bc19b29a2104c476</de:messagedigest> 
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</wb:IEBrowserCacheFile> 
Table 4: Evidence Content message digest property 
The value of the de:messageDigest property is the hash of the Digital Evidence Content 
obtained from the file. Work in the xml signature area has already defined a datatype 
representing a sha1 message digest, and defined a URI representing this datatype, we use 
the URL http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1 to specify the datatype of this property.  
Integrity of the Evidence Metadata Files is maintained within the Tag File, by definition of 
separate de:EvidenceMetadataContainer instances per Evidence Metadata File, as presented 
in Table 5. Integrity of the content is assured by the inclusion of a message digest of the 
Evidence Metadata File, using the de:messageDigest property. 
<deb:EvidenceMetadataContainer> 
  <deb:contains rdf:resource="urn:deid:isi.qut.edu.au:sha1:dc04e8f06b2a32e7d673c380c4d2c8a1d5ea17d4:image" /> 
  <de:messageDigest rdf:datatype=http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1 
>731251ae7216b935cccf51a4018a00d8d89a89cd</de:messagedigest> 
  <fs:filePath>file:///./jbloggs.history.index.dat.rdf</fs:filePath> 
</deb:EvidenceMetadataContainer> 
Table 5: Evidence Metadata Container Metadata stored in the Tag File. 
As the focus of this paper is not the mechanics of integrity maintenance, we do not specify 
the format or contents of the Tag Integrity File. We expect that the contents of the file may 
be formatted according to the XML Signatures standard (Bartel et. al., 2002), or some other 
standard. We do not consider here what kind of archive is used as the bag medium.  
1.9 Evidence provenance 
We provide no construct that directly translates to the audit oriented functions of the Tag 
Continuity Blocks of the DEB proposal, as we expect that further application of tools to 
sealed bags will result in new digital evidence bags being produced. The Provenance 
Metadata within these new bags would refer back to the original bag, thus serving this role. 
1.10 Clarifications 
It appears that the DEB allows a number of pieces of evidence to be stored in a single 
Evidence Content File. We restrict the definition of the Evidence Content File to refer to a 
container with exactly one piece of evidence content. 
5 USAGE SCENARIO – IMAGING AND ANNOTATION 
We demonstrate the modular manner in which forensic tools may interoperate with 
evidence bags built using the sealed digital evidence bags approach by way of the following 
example.  
In this case, the examiner uses a DEB enabled hard drive imaging application for acquiring 
the evidence image. This tool is scripted together from a variant of the UNIX dd3 tool, and 
the Linux hdparm utility4. The examiner acquires the hard drive using this utility, resulting 
in a digital evidence bag containing an Evidence Content File, called hda.dd, an Evidence 
Metadata File, called hda.dd.rdf, as well as Tag.rfd. The imaging application is designed to 
be as simple as possible, and produce a sealed digital evidence bag. It automatically 
generates a message digest of the Tag.rdf file and stores it in the Tag Integrity File, 
                                                 
3
 A low level block oriented copying tool found on most UNIX variants. 
4
 A utility which queries information such as serial numbers, size, and addressing 
information from hard disks. 
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Tag.rdf.sig. At this point the evidence bag is sealed, and considered immutable, depending 
on the underlying scheme of implementation of the Tag Signature. 
However, the examiner has further data associated with this digital evidence bag, namely 
the Job ID, a case specific name, the examiner’s name and identifying details, and perhaps 
the serial number printed on the drive. An evidence annotation program is used by the 
examiner to create a new, unsealed digital evidence bag, and the original digital evidence 
bag embedded within it. A new Tag File is created within this the new bag by the annotation 
application. The additional data is entered using the annotation user interface, and added to 
the Tag File. In this case the annotation editor eschews creating a new Evidence Metadata 
File, as no new evidence has been acquired.  
There are two distinct activities involved in the above scenario: evidence acquisition and 
evidence annotation. By the former, we refer to the process of making an exact copy of a 
piece of digital evidence, for example a hard disk. The latter refers to the act of recording 
details relevant to the acquisition process and the evidence source. By modularizing these 
two tasks, individual tool complexity is reduced, which has the potential to increase 
reliability and enable testing at a more granular level. Bugs in the consuming forensic tool 
(the annotation tool), are more likely not to jeopardize the integrity of the product of the 
evidence acquisition task.  
The annotation tool annotates the information in the original sealed digital evidence bag by 
asserting new properties and their values, related to the DEID of the particular piece of 
information from the subject bag, as new RDF triples. These triples are stored in the Tag 
File of the new unsealed DEB. In reference to the above example, the new data is related to 
the instance representing the Hard Disk by means of its unique identifier. A depiction of a 
portion of the RDF graph formed from the new information as well as the original evidence 
metadata is presented in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: RDF graph resulting from addition of new metadata to embedded DEB 
Modularity is not only facilitated in terms of interoperability between forensics tools, but 
also facilitates modular composition of ontologies. In this way an organisation could create 
its own specific ontology (say for the purpose of adding an organisation specific identifier) 
which would seamlessly integrate with the existing RDF graph and ontology. We allude to a 
further ontology (fooPolice) which defines the  fooPolice:jobID property, in Figure 7. 
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have proposed an approach to addressing the representational challenges in 
building modular, and interoperable forensics tools. We propose the use of Resource 
Description Framework (RDF) as a common data representation layer for digital evidence 
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related metadata, and the use of ontologies for describing the vocabulary related to this data. 
Furthermore, we propose a globally unique identification scheme for identifying digital 
evidence and related metadata. We have applied the approach to Turner’s Digital Evidence 
Bags container proposal, and identified a number of shortcomings or omissions. An 
alternative structure for the digital evidence bag was proposed and a novel architecture for 
digital evidence integration which we call the Sealed Digital Evidence Bag approach was 
identified. Proof of concept was demonstrated by way of describing the operation of a 
prototype online acquisition application.  
We have focused on validating the approach to representation in this work, have built a 
simple set of digital evidence related ontologies, and a prototype acquisition tool which are 
published at http://www.isi.qut.edu.au/2005/sdeb/. This ontology is however a proof of 
concept, and we believe that the field of digital forensics would benefit from a standardised 
ontology describing its domain.  
We have not considered media layer or container of the digital evidence bag, and expect 
that work may be needed in reconciling the composable nature of our digital evidence bags, 
with concerns of IO and storage efficiency. 
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